, Alesina (1988 Alesina ( , 1989 , and Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) found that more independent central banks are associated with lower levels of inflation. This note investigates whether one can find a correlation between central bank independence and the level and variability of real economic variables such as growth, unemployment, and real interest rates. Our conclusion is that while central bank independence promotes price stability, it has no measurable impact on real economic performance.
THEORY
As Rogoff (1985) notes, dynamic inconsistency theories of inflation of the type developed in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) make it plausible that more independent central banks will reduce the rate of inflation. Delegating monetary policy to an agent whose preferences are more inflation averse than are society's preferences serves as a commitment device that permits sustaining a lower rate of inflation than would otherwise be possible. Alesina and Grilli (1992) develop this argument by showing that the "median voter" would want to appoint a central banker more inflation averse than himself. However, the "median voter" wants to be "time inconsistent" and recall the central banker, who, ex post, is being too conservative on the inflation front.
Insulating monetary policy from the political process avoids this problem and helps enforce the low inflation equilibrium. Without some degree of political independence, it would be impossible to appoint a central banker more inflation averse than a majority of the voters, which is a socially desirable goal.
What about the effect of central bank independence on real variables? Maintaining the presumption that monetary policy has real effects, plausible arguments point in varying directions. Central bank independence might improve real economic performance for several reasons. First, an independent central bank that is free from political pressure may behave more predictably, promoting economic stability and reducing risk premia in real interest rates. More specifically, an independent central bank may serve to insulate the economy from political business cycles either by preventing preelection manipulation of monetary policy as in the models of Nordhaus (1975) , and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) or by reducing partisan shocks to policy following elections as in the models of Hibbs (1987) and Alesina (1988 Alesina ( , 1989 . For a more extensive theoretical and empirical discussion of the politics of monetary policy and of political business cycles see ' Willett (1988) .
Second, to the extent that high inflation has adverse effects on economic performance either by creating distortions, encouraging rent seeking activity, or by raising risk premia, one would expect central bank independence to improve economic performance. If, as is often suggested (for example, Romer and Romer (1989) ) most U.S. recessions result from the Federal Reserve cracking down on inflation after it has been allowed to increase too much, one might expect that more consistently inflation-averse policy would be associated with less variable economic performance.
On the other hand, traditional arguments for monetary policies that are politically responsive stress that politically sensitive central bankers are likely to be more concerned than independent bankers with increasing output and reducing unemployment and real interest rates. If monetary policy can achieve these objectives one might expect independent central banks to achieve lower rates of inflation at the price of inferior real economic performance. Rogoff (1985) provides a formal model of this trade-of, in his model more inflation-averse central bankers engage in less discretionary stabilization economic policy and therefore tolerate more cyclical variability in economic activity.
The impact of central bank independence on economic performance is ultimately an empirical question. We therefore turn to the data.
MEASURING CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
The central difficulty in examining the question of central bank independence is measuring the independence of the central bank in different countries, a task at-'This volume, in addition to political business cycles models, considers "bureaucratic" models of central banks, in which the latter are viewed as bureaucratic bodies whose goal is to maximize their influence.
tempted by several authors. Bade and Parkin (1982) construct a (1-4) scale of central bank independence for twelve countries based on the "political independence" of the central bank. Using the same criteria as Bade and Parkin, Alesina (1988) adds four more countries. Political independence is taken to depend on the institutional relationship between the central bank and the executive, the procedure to nominate and dismiss the head of the central bank, the role of government officials on the central bank board, and the frequency of contacts between the executive and the bank. We rely upon the amended version of the Bade and Parkin scale provided in Alesina (1988) .
More recently Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) construct a related measure of central bank independence that reflects both "political independence" and "economic independence." Political independence is defined essentially as in Bade and Parkin (1982) , as the ability of the central bank to select its policy objectives without influence from the government. This measure is based on factors such as whether or not its governor and the board are appointed by the government, the length of their appointments, whether government representatives sit on the board of the bank, whether government approval for monetary policy decisions is required and whether the "price stability" objective is explicitly and prominently part of the central bank statute. "Economic independence" is defined as the ability to use instruments of monetary policy without restrictions. The most common constraint imposed upon the conduct of monetary policy is the extent to which the central bank is required to finance government deficit. This index of economic independence essentially measures how easy it is for the government to finance its deficits by direct access to credit from the central bank.2 Table Ihighlights the two indices and our averaging procedure: both indices are defined as increasing in the amount of independence, and are broadly consistent with each other.3 In our empirical work-which follows, we use the average of the two indices, which is reported in the last column of Table 1 . Very similar results are obtained when either scale is used individ~ally.~ It should be emphasized that the rankings summarized above reflect central banks' laws and constitutions. Such laws are subject to change, although quite infrequently. The rankings described above are relevant for the sample period studied here, 1955-88. Very recently, the degree of central bank independence has been increased in a few countries. These changes are, however, too recent to be relevant for our sample.5
ZFor more details on the construction of this index, the reader is referred to Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) .
3Broadly speaking, the difference between the two indices arises mostly from the fact that Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) place more weight than Bade and Parkin (1982) on rules concerning monetary financing of government deficits.
4The index by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini is not available for the three Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden). For two of these countries we relied on the Bade and Parkin index.
SThis is the case, for instance, in Canada, Italy, and New Zealand. Changes in central bank laws might be endogenous, in the sense that governments may respond with institutional reforms to periods of high inflation. See Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1991) for a discussion of this issue in a large sample of countries. I. This is the ~ndex orlglnally proposed by Bade and Parkin (1982) and extended by Alesina (1988) . 2. Sum of the ~ndexes of economic and political independence computed by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellmi (1991) . 3. Conversion from the GMT scale to a (1) to (4) scale comparable wlth the BP scale. The conversion IS as follows:
GMT index ( r ) conversion i > 11 4 7 < i S l l 3 4 < 1 5 7 2 1 5 4 I 4. Average of columns (1) and (3).
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Our empirical procedure is extremely simple. We plot various measures of economic performance covering the entire 1955-1988 period against measures of central bank independence. Using the data in the Appendix (Tables A1 and A2) Figures 2a and 2b investigate the relationship between central bank independence and either the level or variability of economic growth. None emerges. Switzerland, which has an extremely independent central bank, shows much slower and variable growth than the average country in the sample, while Germany and Netherlands which also have relatively independent central banks have relatively good economic performance. On the other hand, countries with relatively dependent central banks such as Spain and New Zealand have relatively variable economic growth whereas France with a relatively dependent central bank has enjoyed steady growth.6 Analo6These results are consistent with similar findings obtained independently by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) , who use a different sample and methodology. These results suggest that the monetary discipline associated with central bank independence reduces the level and variability of inflation but does not have either large benefits or costs in terms of real macroeconomic performance. This observation represents at least a fragment of evidence in support of theories emphasizing the neutrality of money.
Our findings also have implications for the ongoing debate over the optimal rules governing monetary policy. Most obviously they suggest the economic performance merits of central bank independence. More subtly, they raise questions about the benefits of rule-based monetary policies. Advocates of rule-based policies typically stress that they avoid dynamic consistency inflation. The findings here suggest that it is possible for nations to achieve these benefits without setting a monetary rule by insulating the central bank from political control. While it is possible that rulebased performance would be superior to discretionary performance on stabilization grounds, Summers (1988) notes a number of reasons why this is unlikely including unforeseen events and the possibility of an economy getting trapped in the neighborhood of a suboptimal equilibrium around which stabilization would be undesirable.7
The results here are not conclusive in the sense that we have looked at the data only in a very straightforward way; more detailed analysis of the relation between central bank independence and real performance is warranted. For example, it might be useful to use central bank independence as an instrument in studying the effects of intercountry differences in monetary policy, or to include additional control variables of the type considered in Summers and Wadwhani (1989) in assessing the impact of central bank independence on economic performance.
Furthermore, the degree of central baqk independence is only one of several institutional factors, exchange rate arrangements, and exogenous shocks that influence economic performance in different countries.8 Our results here do, however, create some presumption that the inflation benefits of central bank independence are likely to outweigh any output costs.
Finally, the degree of central bank independence may be an endogenous variable. For instance, the historical experience of a hyperinflation in Germany may have raised the German public aversion to inflation and its propensity to have an independent central bank committed to price stability. Within the sample period considered in this study, it is a reasonable assumption to hold central bank laws as constant and exogenous. A more "historical" analysis concerned with the long-term evolution of institutional arrangements should tackle issues related to the joint endogeneity between economic outcomes and institutions.
'For further discussion of various institutional rules and reforms with specific reference to the Federal Reserve see the last chapter in Willett (1988) .
8For discussions of various other politico-institutional determinants of inflation in different countries see, for instance, Black (1982) , several contributions in Willett (1988) , Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) , Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992).
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